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C ONFLICTS of interests arise whenever the representation of a
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's duties to either
another client or a third person or by the interests of the lawyer her-
self.' Analyzing such conflicts typically requires identifying situations
involving a potentially impermissible conflict, determining whether
the conflict is consentable, and, if it is, obtaining consent after full
disclosure.2 Conflicts analysis is difficult enough when the client is an
adult.3 When the client is a child, however, the analysis is complicated
by a number of factors.
For example, in the wide variety of cases in which children (or their
interests) are involved, the child's role varies enormously. In some
cases, the child is actually a party; in others, the child has a legal inter-
est of some sort; in still others, the outcome will affect the child only
indirectly. Moreover, a child's interests can be protected in a variety
of fashions, some of which involve legal representation, some of which
involve appointment of a guardian ad litem (who may be a lawyer),
and some of which involve indirect protection through the participa-
tion of the parent. Even when it is clear that the lawyer's role is actual
representation, it may be unclear to whom the lawyer turns when de-
cisions on behalf of the child are to be made. In some cases, the child
may sue (or be sued) only through the parent as guardian or next
friend. In other cases, the child may be named as a party, but the
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law.
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules]; see also id. Rule 1.8 (prohibited transactions); id. Rule 1.9 (representation of
former clients); Id. Rule 1.10 (imputed conflicts); id. Rule 1.11 (conflicts involving
government lawyers); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1 (1981)
[hereinafter Model Code] (stating that "[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer
should be... solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties"). By 1994, the District of Columbia and all but six states had adopted
some form of the Model Rules. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Con-
duct 1:3 to 1:4 (1994).
2: ALI-ABA Comm. on Continuing Professional Education, A Practical Guide
to Achieving Excellence in the Practice of Law: Standards, Methods, and Self-Evalu-
ation § 2.2(a) & cmt. (1992) (discussing lawyer's duty to fully disclose to the client);
Charles Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 7.2.4, at 343 (1986); see Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 201-216 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990).
3. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Conflict of Interest in the Simultaneous Representa-
tion of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Contro-
versy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1982) (discussing the difficulties in analyzing conflicts in
the simultaneous representation of multiple clients and the inadequacies of both the
Model Code and the Model Rules).
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parent may assert the right to make some or all decisions on the
child's behalf. In still others, the child may not be a party at all, but
the court may permit or assign a lawyer to represent either the child
or the child's guardian or guardian ad litem. Finally, the lawyer may
choose or be asked to represent more than one party; for example, the
lawyer may attempt to represent both parent and child, agency and
child, or multiple siblings. All these situations involve at least the po-
tential for conflicting interests; however, only some of the issues
raised are amenable to resolution through conflict of interests analy-
sis. Moreover, even among those issues that do fall within the pur-
view of conflict of interests rules, there are several unique aspects of
the representation of children which ultimately call for an analysis far
more complex than that typically encountered in even the most intrac-
table conflicts issues involving adults.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLIENT IDENTIFICATION: CONFLICTING
INTERESTS VERSUS "CONFLICT OF INTERESTS"
It is a common misperception that the presence of conflicting inter-
ests necessarily signifies a "conflict of interests" problem-that is, one
in which applicable standards of professional conduct may require
separate representation. 4 Conflict of interests standards, however, ap-
ply only when there is some interest or duty on the part of the lawyer
which interferes with her representation of a client.5 Thus, if we want,
to talk about a lawyer's conflicts of interests in the representation of
children, we need to eliminate from the discussion those situations in
which the lawyer has not formed an attorney-client relationship with a
child.6
This situation sometimes arises in proceedings such as custody,
abuse and neglect, and termination of parental rights. These are all
proceedings in which the outcome will profoundly affect a child's life,
regardless of whether the child is a formal party to the litigation,7 yet
1
4. See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
5. See sources cited supra note 1. The only exception involves conflict of inter-
ests rules which preclude lawyers from undertaking representation adverse to former
clients. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.9.
6. Lawyers who serve in nonrepresentative fiduciary capacities (such as trustees
or guardians) may well have conflicts of interests; for example, those resulting from
other fiduciary obligations or from self-interest. These conflicts, however, will be gov-
erned by law which is applicable to fiduciaries generally (including nonlawyer fiducia-
ries) and not by the conflict of interests provisions of lawyer codes. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959) (duty of loyalty). Such conflict of inter-
ests dilemmas are beyond the scope of this Article.
7. Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The Proper
Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423,
424-25 (1993); see also James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children:
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 565, 570-80 (1976) (identifying the legal proceedings where the need for
child advocacy is crucial); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not
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it is not uncommon for courts to assume that the child's interests will
adequately be protected either by another party to the proceeding8 or
by the court itself.9 Although some of these cases involve lawyers im-
properly representing multiple clients with conflicting interests (for
example, agency and child or parent and child), others raise no "con-
flict of interests" issues at all.
For example, in a case severely criticized by at least one commenta-
tor,10 a child welfare agency sought to remove a five-year-old girl from
her foster parents after the foster parents attempted to adopt the girl,
in violation of a contract they signed with the agency." According to
the agency's attorney, the foster parents, by coming to view them-
selves as the child's true parents, had created a difficult and damaging
situation necessitating the child's removal. 2 Carefully delineating the
various ways in which the interests of the agency (as well as the foster
parents) potentially conflicted with the interests of the child,' 3 the
commentator castigates not only the court majority for failing to ap-
point separate counsel for the child, but also the agency's attorney,
disparagingly remarking that "[t]here is an absurd pathos when a
child's presumed advocate [that is, the agency's attorney] argues that
foster parents are unqualified for indulging the infant with too much
love in a comfortable home." 4 The commentator concludes by argu-
ing that the case vividly "demonstrates the danger of a court's presum-
ing, without inquiry, that a certain party can properly represent the
Heard. Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 77
(1984) (discussing the necessity of independent representation of children in legal
proceedings).
8. Cf In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 156 N.E.2d 700, 700 (N.Y. 1959) (where
child had no counsel in dispute between foster parents and child welfare agency).
Jewish Child Care Ass'n is discussed infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., People ex rel D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 648 (S.D. 1976) (holding that
although it was within power of court to appoint counsel to represent interests of
child in neglect case, it was also within inherent power of court to protect child by
waiving physician-patient privilege to allow admission of medical testimony).
10. See Genden, supra note 7, at 567-70 (discussing Jewish Child Care Ass'n).
11. Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 156 N.E.2d at 701-02.
12. Id at 705 (Dye, J., dissenting).
13. Genden, supra note 7, at 569. Genden states:
There was no true advocate for Laura's best interests in this custody strug-
gle. While it first appeared that the [foster parents] were taking a position
parallel to Laura's interests in the suit, they were actually advocating their
own interests in adoption. It was unclear where Laura's best interests lay.
Her welfare may have been better served by a permanent placement, either
with adoptive parents or her own mother, than by the foster home place-
ment which was all the agency could offer. The Jewish Child Care Associa-
tion had to defend its own prestige, self-image, obligations, and rights. No
party was certain to speak up for Laura, let alone take a position in her
behalf uncolored by self-interest.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. at 568-69 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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child" without considering "the child as a distinct individual whose
interests must be clearly presented."' 5
It may very well be that the child should have been given her own
attorney, or at least provided with some other means by which her
interests could be "clearly presented" to the court.' 6 The reason,
however, has nothing to do with any violation of conflict of interests
standards by the agency's attorney or with any failure of the court to
recognize an ethical problem involving the agency's attorney. The at-
torney represented one client only and that client was clearly the wel-
fare agency and not the child. Moreover, the court did not even
presume that the child was directly or even indirectly represented by
the state's attorney. Rather, what the court apparently presumed was
that the nature of the proceedings were such that the interests of the
child would sufficiently be protected so that the child did not need
either to be made a formal party or otherwise to be heard through her
own representative.' 7 One might well disagree with this conclusion,' 8
but not because the state's attorney was burdened with any potentially
unethical conflict of interests. Rather, in these situations, it would be
far more accurate to argue that what is needed is an advocate for a
15. Id. at 569-70.
16. Thus, numerous commentators have urged that representation be provided on
behalf of children in similar proceedings, including custody disputes. See, e.g., Henry
H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 Faro. L. Q. 343, 374
(1972) (stating thdt the implementation of a child's right to counsel is the most effec-
tive way to protect the child's interests); Genden, supra note 7, at 570-80 (discussing
six types of litigation in which independent representation may be beneficial);
Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte A. Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody
Cases, 5 Faro. L. Q. 108 (1971) (calling for independent representation in custody
disputes); James R. Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel
and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 521, 546
(1977) (calling for independent representation in child abuse proceedings). But cf.
Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 77 (urging reconsideration of need for appointed coun-
sel when child is too young to provide effective guidance).
At present, nearly all states mandate that a guardian ad litem or attorney be ap-
pointed for the child in civil judicial proceedings arising from a charge of abuse or
neglect. 2 Donald T. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 16.24 (2d ed. 1994). A ma-
jority of jurisdictions authorize courts to appoint representatives for children involved
in custody proceedings. 1 id. § 2.25.
17. Jonathan Hafen makes a similar point when he attempts to distinguish be-
tween representation of the child and representation of the child's interests. See
Hafen, supra note 7, at 424 & n.3 (observing that when the parents' interests do not
conflict with the child's, the interests of the child are "implicitly represented" by the
parents). Even this articulation is confusing, however, because it would not be accu-
rate to say that the state's attorney in this case represented the child's interests, even
implicitly. Rather, the court seems merely to assume that it can determine where the
child's best interests lie, given an adversarial proceeding in which both the agency and
the foster parents present evidence and make arguments on that very question. This
assumption is forcefully challenged by all the various authorities arguing in favor of
direct representation of the child or the child's interests, through either an attorney or
a guardian ad litem. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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presently unrepresented child9 as opposed to an inadequately repre-
sented child.2 °
Even when a lawyer expressly appears on behalf of a child, failure
to clarify the precise role of the lawyer may cause conflict of interests
problems to be raised inappropriately. For example, lawyers are com-
monly appointed to represent one or more children in a variety of
proceedings, and the question often arises whether separate counsel
must be appointed when the children-for example, multiple sib-
lings-differ in their views as to the appropriate outcome.2 ' If the
lawyer is serving solely as a guardian ad litem, then the answer should
be "no." This is because a guardian ad litem is traditionally viewed as
an agent of the court, to which it owes its principal duty of allegiance,
and not strictly as legal counsel to a child client.2 Although the
guardian ad litem is required to ascertain the child's wishes, feelings,
attachments, and attitudes (because they are relevant to determining
the child's best interests), there is no requirement that the guardian
advocate such wishes and feelings.2 3 Thus, if the lawyer-guardian con-
cludes that the best interests of all the children are the same (despite
their different desires), then there is not even a potential conflict of
interests.2 4
19. See In re Tyease J., 373 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Surr. Ct. 1975). Criticizing an ear-
lier opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in which that court had granted an
adoption by a stepfather on the urging of the natural mother and over the objection of
the natural father, the court in Tyease J. stated:
No attorney appointed by any court appeared for that infant in [the Court of
Appeals case]; it is to be hoped that the Court of Appeals or the Legislature
will shortly mandate such representation, as was provided in the case at bar.
Without such representation, the natural parent vigorously focuses on paren-
tal rights and claims. The approach centers on whether "this child belongs to
me," without an equal inquiry, on behalf of the unrepresented infant on
whether "this parent belongs to me."
Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
20. In State ex reL Juvenile Dep't v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753 (Or. Ct. App. 1974),
overruled by 547 P.2d 175 (Or. 1976), two children appealed a decision terminating
parental rights on the ground that they were entitled to "independent" legal represen-
tation. The court of appeals saw the issue as "whether either the district attorney or
the counsel for the parents is capable of providing the children with the 'effective'
representation to which they have a constitutional claim." Id. at 756. The court then
concluded that because of the potential conflicts between the interests of the children
and those of both the state and the parents, the children had not obtained such effec-
tive representation. Id at 757. A better conclusion would have been that, contrary to
an applicable Oregon statute, the children had obtained no representation at all.
21. See, e.g., In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Iowa 1988) (involving 13-year-old
daughter who opposed termination of parental rights and claimed her constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel was denied because her court-appointed attor-
ney and guardian ad litem also represented her brother who favored termination).
22. State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
23. See id.
24. Even when the lawyer appears as a legal representative of more than one
child, it is not always clear that conflicting desires result in a conflict of interests under
rules of professional conduct. The weight of authority is that an attorney must advo-
1996] 1823
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Finally, the applicability of conflict of interests analysis is also prob-
lematic in representations involving multiple family members where
there is significant ambiguity regarding the precise identity of the law-
yer's client or clients. For example, a parent will often retain a lawyer
regarding a matter in which a child's interests are involved, with the
parent fully expecting not only to select and compensate the lawyer,
but also to play a significant role in directing the course of the repre-
sentation. If the lawyer represents the parent alone, then standard
conflicts analysis simply does not apply, regardless of any disagree-
ments or other conflict of interests between parent and child. On the
other hand, if the lawyer represents both parent and child, then stan-
dard conflicts analysis is clearly relevant in deciding what to do if the
clients disagree during the course of the representation or if the law-
yer believes that it may be in the child's best interest2 s to sue or take
other adverse action against the parent. Even when the lawyer repre-
sents the child alone (and not the parent), standard conflicts analysis
could result in significant limitations on a parent's ability either to pay
for the lawyer's services or to direct or influence the lawyer's in-
dependent judgment on behalf of the child.26 Given all these different
possibilities, it is critical that the lawyer understand exactly whom she
is (and is not) representing.
When the representation involves multiple family members, client
identification depends on a number of complex factors, including the
cate the child's wishes and desires, except perhaps when the child is very young. See
Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child.- The Role of Independent Coun-
sel for Minors 681, 693-706 (1987). However, there is some authority that even an
attorney representing a child in a nonguardian capacity should" 'advocate the child's
best interest, not the child's wishes.'" J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d at 391 (quoting In re Mar-
riage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985). If the attorney is to advocate the
child's best interests, then it may be sufficient for the attorney to inform the court of
both the children's different desires and the basis for the attorney's determination
that their interests are the same. "[S]uch an approach obviates the expensive and
burdensome practice of appointing both a guardian ad litem and attorney for each
child in a family to ensure that the child's expressed wishes as well as best interest are
advocated." Id. at 392.
Standard conflicts questions clearly do arise when a lawyer represents multiple chil-
dren in a traditional lawyer-client relationship-that is, advocating legitimate client
desires. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. They also apply when a lawyer
has conflicts attributable to the lawyer's dual role as both attorney and guardian ad
litem. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
25. Even if the lawyer's role is to advocate the child's wishes and not what the
lawyer determines to be in the child's best interests, see supra note 24, the lawyer
should counsel the child regarding the lawyer's views. As with adult clients, lawyers
should always "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ad-
vice." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 2.1. Of course, the client is free to reject the
lawyer's advice whenever a particular decision is allocated to the client. Id Rule 1.2;
see also Jean Koh Peters, Representing Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1505, 1513 (1996) [page 9 in manuscript] (stating that lawyers
should counsel the client regarding the client's best interests in order to assist clients
in making decisions).
26. See infra part IV.
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desires and expectations of all the interested parties (including the
lawyer). 27 Ideally, these are matters which the lawyer will raise at the
outset of the representation in an effort to clarify the nature of her
relationship with both parent and child. Unfortunately, the subject is
often left unaddressed, with the result that one or more of the parties
may have expectations which are not shared by the others.' Here,
the identity of the client may depend on the nature of the representa-
tion itself-for example, whether it involves a custody, abuse or ne-
glect, or termination of parental rights proceeding,2 9 a juvenile
delinquency proceeding,30 or a civil litigation brought by a parent on a
child's behalf.31 In addition, client identification may further be com-
27. For an extended discussion of the extent to which putative client expectations
are sufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship, see Nancy J. Moore, Ex-
panding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client
Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45
S.C. L. Rev. 659 (1994).
28. There are a number of recurring situations which are fraught with potential
ambiguity regarding the identity of a lawyer's client or clients, including representa-
tion involving entities and their constituent members, representation involving family
members, representation involving transactions between buyers and sellers or bor-
rowers and lenders, and representation of fiduciaries. Id. at 695. In all of these areas,
lawyers who fail to clarify the nature of their representation are increasingly being
sued by individuals who reasonably believed that the lawyers represented them, even
when the lawyers did not intend to do so. See id. at 695-703.
29. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text. Another area which is particu-
larly fraught with ambiguity concerns representation involving children with disabili-
ties. For example, under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994), when a dispute arises with school officials, both the par-
ents and the child have a right to contest any aspect of a proposed program of special
education. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Md. 1993) (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)), appeal dismissed, 14 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, the lawyer
could be representing either parent or child or both. Although in many cases there is
no disagreement between parents and children, there are certainly circumstances in
which a child old enough to express a preference will disagree with what the parent
wants. Whether this disagreement will even surface may depend on the extent to
which the attorney believes she is representing the child (and is thus bound to at least
find out what the child's preferences are). For a discussion of conflicts of interests in
the representation of children with disabilities, see David H. Neely, Handicapped Ad-
vocacy: Inherent Barriers and Partial Solutions in the Representation.of Disabled Chil-
dren, 33 Hastings L. 1359, 1395-1400 (1982); see also Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent
Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing Severely and Profoundly
Retarded Individuals, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 625 (1979) (identifying various difficulties in-
herent in the legal representation of severely retarded individuals). For an interesting
discussion of client identification under the IDEA, raised in a unique context, com-
pare Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611 (denying attorney's fees to a father representing
his child at an IDEA hearing and holding that because protection extends to parents
as well as children, a parent who represents child also represents himself, and attor-
neys' fees cannot be awarded to pro se litigants) with Miller v. W. Lafayette Commu-
nity Sch. Corp. 645 N.E.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging rights
and interests of parents under IDEA statute, but refusing to follow Rappaport and
concluding that at all times student, not parents, was father's client).
1996] 1825
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plicated by the presence of difficult, frequently unresolved, legal is-
sues regarding the status of children vis-A-vis their parents.32
Perhaps the easiest cases in which to determine the client's identity
are those where the lawyer appears in a custody, abuse or neglect, or
termination of parental rights proceeding. Here, there is little poten-
tial for ambiguity, probably because the conflict of interests between
parent and child is so glaring.33 The parents are formal parties to the
proceeding and will typically be represented by their own counsel at
an early stage of the proceeding. The attorney for a parent is unlikely
to believe that she actually represents the child as well (although some
attorneys may mistakenly believe that they have an ethical duty to
compromise their representation of the parent in order to protect the
child).34 Nor is a child likely to view the parent's attorney as his rep-
resentative. Courts have increasingly recognized the need for children
to be separately represented (either by a guardian ad litem or by an
attorney advocate). 35 When such an attorney is appointed, it will be
clear (in most cases) that this attorney represents the child only. What
is sometimes less clear-and will receive more extensive discussion
below36 -is the extent to which a parent may play any role in the
selection of a particular lawyer to represent the child in these cases.
Of course, in delinquency cases, the children are themselves formal
parties to the proceedings; indeed, they are the only persons whose
interests are directly affected by the outcome.37 Thus, it is not surpris-
32. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
33. The existence of a conflict of interests should not in itself preclude a finding
that an attorney-client relationship has been established if in a particular case, there is
either an express or implied agreement or reasonable reliance on the part of the puta-
tive client. See Moore, supra note 27, at 664-65.
34. This surmise is based on anecdotal evidence. Certainly to the extent that the
child is not represented at all, attorneys may feel a moral obligation to make at least
some effort to protect the interests of the child. Under the Model Rules, such efforts
are permissible only in advising the client, see Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 2.1,
and in disclosing a client's intent to commit a crime threatening imminent death or
seriots bodily harm. See icL Rule 1.6(b)(1); see also State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v.
Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 757 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that attorney's duty to parents
"not modified or diminished in any way by any obligation to protect the 'best inter-
ests' of the child"), overruled by 547 P.2d 175 (Or. 1976).
35. See, e.g., In re Lackey, 390 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Il. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that
representation by public defender of parents and public defender's appearance as
guardian ad litem for child constituted actual conflict of interest and reversible error),
aff'd, 405. N.E.2d 748 (Ill. 1980).
36. See infra part IV.
37. Parents may be directly affected in a minority of cases-for example, where
the parent might be required to participate in a particular dispositional plan. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Advisory C6mm. on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention: Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Standard 16.6 (1976) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Standards] (requiring separate counsel in such cases), discussed in Janet R.
Fink, Who Decides: The Role of Parent or Guardian in Juvenile Delinquency Repre-
sentation, in Ethical Problems Facing the Criminal Defense Lawyer 119, 124 (Rodney
J. Uphoff ed., 1995). Parents are also significantly affected in cases where there is a
1826 [Vol. 64
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ing that there is a consensus among both lawyers and commentators
that a lawyer who enters an appearance in such a proceeding does so
on behalf of the child and not the parent.38 Nevertheless, parents
often expect to play a significant role in the course of the proceeding.
If this occurs they may come to believe that the lawyer is representing
their interests as well as the child's.39 Lawyers wishing to avoid such
confusion can simply explain to the parents that the lawyer represents
the child only and not the parents. Still, difficult questions may arise
regarding the ethical propriety of any attempt by a lawyer to represent
both parent and child (for example, at the express request of a par-
ent), as well as the suitability of a lawyer's permitting the parent-
who may both select and pay the attorney-to direct or influence the
lawyer's judgment on behalf of the child. These are questions which
do indeed implicate standard conflict of interests analysis,40 and thus
will be discussed in detail below.4 '
The potential for ambiguity is probably greatest when a parent or
guardian contacts a lawyer for legal advice, possibly involving civil liti-
gation, in a matter affecting the interests of a child. In the case of a
guardian or other fiduciary (such as a conservator or trustee), if the
lawyer is consulted regarding the fiduciary's responsibilities, then the
possibility that the parents have abused or neglected the child. In such cases, lawyers
should be careful not only to ensure that a parent does not mistakenly believe that the
lawyer is representing the parent, but also to avoid giving any legal advice, except the
advice that the parent should obtain separate counsel. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra
note 1, Rule 4.3 cmt. (instructing how to deal with unrepresented persons).
38. See, e.g., F. Lee Bailey & Henry B. Rothblatt, Handling Juvenile Delinquency
Cases § 2:4 (1982) ("The youngster [the lawyer is] defending is [the lawyer's] only
client."); Fink, supra note 37, at 119 ("[lIt is the child, not the parent, who is the client
and decision maker."); 1 Randy Hertz et al., Trial Manual for Defense Attorneys in
Juvenile Court § 2.03 (1991) ("[I]t is the child, and not the parent or guardian, who is
the 'client ....' "); Stanley Z. Fisher, Parents' Right and Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A
Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 835, 843-
44 ("[C]ourts and commentators have overwhelmingly understood [In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967),] to recognize delinquency defendant's independent right to counsel").
But see Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 129 (1979)
("Gault reaffirms the right of a child to have his own parents make decisions about
what he needs."), discussed in Fisher, supra, at 844. Even Goldstein et al. may not
dispute the fact that it is the child who is the client; rather, what they are contesting is
the assumption that simply because the child is the client, the child has an independ-
ent right to retain or direct the lawyer. In other words, there is no necessary con-
gruity between client identification and the allocation of decision making on behalf of
a client. But see infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
39. In addition to believing that the lawyer will be loyal to them and their interests
(as well as to the child and the child's interests), the parents may also believe that
their communications with the lawyer are confidential. For a discussion of the limits
of an attorney's duty of confidentiality to parents as noncients, see infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
40. Aside from conflicts, the questions raise serious and important issues regard-
ing the allocation of decision making between parent, child, and attorney. Indeed,
issues regarding the proper locus of decision making on behalf of children are them-
selves critical to the analysis of the conflict of interests issues. See infra part IV.
41. See infra part IV.
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client is ordinarily considered to be the fiduciary and not the benefici-
ary.42 Parents are the natural guardians of their children.4 3 Neverthe-
less, unless the parent is also a trustee (for example, under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act),44 it is not at all clear when the parent is
consulting the lawyer in a matter involving fiduciary responsibilities
on the part of the parent.45 As a result, there is enormous potential
for confusion over whether the lawyer represents the parent, the child,
or both, especially when the parent wants to bring civil litigation on
behalf of the child.
Under the procedural codes of most jurisdictions, a minor does not
have the capacity to sue on her own behalf and may only sue or be
sued through a "representative, such as a general guardian" or "by a
next friend or by a guardian ad litem."46 Absent unusual circum-
stances,47 parents are entitled to bring lawsuits on behalf of their chil-
dren. However, whether they do so as general guardians48 or as next
42. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who
is the Client?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1319, 1321-22 (1994) (suggesting that the client is
the personal representative, although some also recognize fiduciary duty may be
owed from attorney directly to beneficiary); Report of Special Study Committee on
Professional Responsibility: Counseling the Fiduciary, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.
825, 827 (1994) (stating that the great majority of courts conclude that client is a fidu-
ciary and rejecting suggestion in Model Rule 1.7 comment that client might be an
entity which includes the beneficiary); see also Moore, supra note 27, at 701-03 (dis-
cussing the inherent ambiguity in client identification for lawyer in representations
involving fiduciaries).
43. See, e.g., Richard V. Mackay, Guardianship and the Protection of Infants 12
(2d ed. 1957) (noting that "[p]arents as natural guardians have complete control over
the person and property of the child during minority").
44. Unif. Gifts to Minors Act §§ 1-13, 8A U.L.A. 375-413 (superseded in 1983 by
the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act).
45. For a rare example of a situation in which it was clear that a parent consulted a
lawyer in the parent's capacity as a fiduciary, see Federer v. Allen, No. CA 94-471,
1995 WL 42511, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1995).
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). The Rule states:
Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or incompetent person
has a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or
other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does
not have a duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or by
guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant
or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make
such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or in-
competent person.
Id See generally 6A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
2d § 1570 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)).
47. See, e.g., Susan R.M. v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 818 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that father who consented to managing conservatorship, thereby relin-
quishing general representation of child to human services department, no longer had
standing to pursue action on child's behalf under Education of All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act).
48. See, e.g., Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 448 F.Supp. 10, 15 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (holding
that mother, as "natural guardian," may bring suit on behalf of minor child without
formality of mother being appointed "next friend"), aff'd, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978);
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friends49 or guardians ad litem5° depends on the vagaries of state
law.5 It is also unclear what the significance of these distinctions
might be as far as client identification is concerned.5' General guardi-
ans are considered real parties in interest in most jurisdictions,53
whereas next friends and guardians ad litem are merely nominal par-
ties, with the minor being the real party in interest.54 Even nominal
parties, however, ordinarily have the authority to make decisions re-
garding the course of the litigation.55 Therefore, characterizing the
minor as the real party in interest does not necessarily mean that the
client must be the child and not the parent (or both).56
see also Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, 702 F.Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (refusing to ap-
point guardian ad litem for minor children who sued through parents because the
parents were their "natural guardians").
49. See, e.g., Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
civil rights action may be brought on behalf of four minor children by father acting as
"next friend," provided the parent is represented by an attorney); Blue v. People, 585
N.E.2d 625, 626 (111. App. Ct.) (holding that father who brought suit on behalf of
minor child challenging visitation orders was at most a "next friend" of minor plain-
tiff), appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 631 (IlM. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 992 (1993); see
also Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1989) (involving mother who
sued individually and "as parent and next friend" of minor children).
50. See, e.g., Rutland v. Sikes, 203 F. Supp. 276, 277 (E.D.S.C.) (noting that father
had been appointed guardian ad litem for son in state action in which both were de-
fendants), aff'd, 311 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1962). At one
time, next friends and guardians ad litem were distinguishable. The former was used
to prosecute an action on behalf of an infant or incompetent and the latter was used
to defend the infant or incompetent. This distinction, however, was abolished under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). See 6A Wright et al., supra note 46, § 1572.
51. 6A Wright et al., supra note 46, § 1571.
52. There is no meaningful distinction between next friends or guardians ad litem,
both of whom are clearly nominal parties and not real parties in interest. See Rutland,
203 F. Supp. at 277 (where failure to appoint guardian ad litem not grounds for vacat-
ing judgment because minor received adequate representation). There might be,
however, a distinction between such nominal parties and a general guardian, who
occupies a more permanent position. For example, general (or legal) guardians are
often characterized as real and not nominal parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). For
purposes of determining who the client is, however, any distinction between real and
nominal parties is itself of questionable significance. See infra notes 53-56 and accom-
panying text. My thanks to my colleague Allan Stein for this point.
53. 6A Wright et al., supra note 46, § 1548.
54. Id § 1570. Other than the fact that an action must be brought in the name of a
real party in interest, id., it is unclear what the significance of this distinction is. At
one time, the distinction may have been critical in determining diversity of citizenship
and venue. A 1988 amendment to the diversity statute, however, now makes the citi-
zenship of the ward controlling even when general guardians and other more perma-
nent fiduciaries sue in their own names. Id.
55. See, e.g., Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that a guardian ad
litem has authority to engage counsel, prosecute, control, and direct litigation). But
see Torres v. Friedman, 215 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that father's
powers of guardian ad litem were limited to procedural steps and did not extend to
actions which prejudiced the substantive rights of the child, such as admissions, waiv-
ers, or stipulations).
56. If the parent's interests conflict with the child's, then courts have the power
either to substitute another person as next friend or to appoint a guardian ad litem,
even when the parent sues as general guardian. See, e.g., Horacek v. Exon, 357 F.
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To the extent that the question is addressed at all, most authorities
assume that the attorney retained by a parent to bring an action on
behalf of the child does form an attorney-client relationship with the
child. For example, there are legal malpractice actions in which mi-
nors sue lawyers through a guardian or next friend regarding prior
litigation in which the lawyer had been retained by a parent acting as
guardian or next friend. 7 In addition, a line of cases holds that a
nonattorney parent may not bring litigation as next friend of a minor
and appear pro se, but rather must retain an attorney for the child. 8
Supp. 71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973) (appointing guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs in civil
rights action because parents' interests might conflict with those of children and such
appointment did not displace parents as general representatives of children).
57. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 926 (6th Cir.) (involving a legal
malpractice action against lawyer retained by father in litigation which the father had
brought on behalf of daughters against third parties), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626, 628 (Miss. 1987) (involving legal malpractice
action against lawyers retained to prosecute medical malpractice action based on
treatment of child); Schlomer v. Perina, 485 N.W.2d 399, 400-01 (Wis. 1992) (involv-
ing legal malpractice action against lawyer retained by parents in personal injury
claims arising out of injuries to minor child). In none of these cases did the lawyers
dispute the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the
child.
58. See Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College, 937 F.2d 876, 883 .(3d Cir. 1991); 01-
tremari v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitative Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (D. Kan.
1994); Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994);
J.W. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527, 528 (Ct. App. 1993); Blue v. People, 585
N.E.2d 625, 626 (I1. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 631 (IMI. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 992 (1993). Earlier opinions stated that a minor child cannot bring suit
through a parent acting as next friend if the parent is not represented by an attorney.
See, e.g., Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that unrepre-
sented parent cannot bring suit on behalf of minor). However, the more recent cases
make clear that the reasons for this rule include prohibitions on the unauthorized
practice of law (because the parent, who is not a real party to the proceeding, cannot
be representing himself or herself, and thus should not be representing the child) and
the desire to protect the interests of the minor. In Osei-Afriyie, the court stated:
The choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state
law... cannot determine their owri legal actions. There is thus no individual
choice to proceed pro se for courts to respect, and the sole policy at stake
concerns the exclusion of non-licensed persons to appear as attorneys on
behalf of others.
It goes without saying that it is not in the interest of minors or incompe-
tents that they be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims
that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal assistance so their
rights may be fully protected.
Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883 (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d
59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). Nevertheless, even in Osei-Afriyie, the court simultaneously
makes statements indicating some confusion as to whom the attorney is representing.
For example, the court states: "[W]e agree with Meeker v. Kercher ... that a non-
attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or
her child." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Perhaps the obvious answer is
that in some sense the attorney is representing both parent and child. See infra note 61
and accompanying text.
Courts have applied the same rule against pro se representation in the case of a
trustee attempting to appear without an attorney in an action brought on behalf of a
trust. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 91-55567, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
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Such cases also hold that minors do not have the capacity to waive the
right to be represented by counsel, and further, that parents will not
be permitted to waive that right on behalf of their children.5 9 Simi-
larly, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") indirectly acknowledge that lawyers often
form attorney-client relationships with children even when a parent or
other guardian may be making decisions regarding the conduct of the
representation, thus suggesting a bifurcation between client identifica-
tion and the allocation of decision-making authority.6 °
Of course, concluding that the lawyer is representing the child does
not fully answer the client identification question. Unless the lawyer
clearly states that she is not also representing the parent, the parent's
reasonable expectations and reliance may form the basis for an attor-
ney-client relationship, despite the contrary intentions of the lawyer.
61
In addition, lawyers still face such questions as the propriety of repre-
senting both the parent and the child (for example, when the parent is
also a party to the proceeding) and how to deal with conflicts of inter-
est between a child client and a nonclient parent who wants to be
active in the representation.
II. CONFLICrS OF INTERESTS PART I: REPRESENTING MULTIPLE
PARTIES
Lawyers representing children are sometimes asked to represent
more than one client, typically either multiple siblings or a child and
one or both parents. Under standard conflicts analysis, the ethical
propriety of any such joint-representation is determined by (1) identi-
fying any potentially impermissible conflicts, (2) deciding whether
such conflicts are consentable, and (3) where they are consentable,
obtaining voluntary consent after full disclosure.62
The first task-identifying potentially impermissible conflicts-is
usually the easiest. Lawyers, however, sometimes fail to spot such
conflicts, especially when there is no present adversity between the
clients. Under Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules, lawyers may not simulta-
neously represent multiple clients (except, in some circumstances,
with the clients' consent) if the representation of one client would be
17374, at *3 (9th Cir. July 9) (holding that a nonattorney trustee may represent him-
self pro se but cannot represent others), aff'd, 999 F.2d 544 (1993); C.E. Pope Equity
Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that one's status as
a trustee does not entitle him to the right to present arguments pro se in federal
court).
59. Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883.
60. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14 cmt. 3 (stating "[i]f a legal representative
has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the
representative for decisions on behalf of the client"). For a further discussion of the
allocation of decision-making authority between parent and child, see infra part IV.
61. See Moore, supra note 27, at 673.
62. See Moore, supra note 3, at 216-21.
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"directly adverse" to the other client or if the representation of either
client would be "materially limited" by the lawyer's duties to the other
client.63 Direct adversity under Model Rule 1.7(a) is rare, except
when a lawyer sues one client on behalf of another, typically on an
unrelated matter.6' This adversity will seldom occur when one of the
clients is a child.6 5
Material limitation under Model Rule 1.7(b) is far more common.6 6
Many lawyers, however, incorrectly assume that such limitation occurs
only when "in behalf of one client, it is [the lawyer's] duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."67 The
63. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of mul-
tiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall in-
lude explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
64. See iL Rule 1.7 cmt. 3; see also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes,
The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
§ 1.7:203 (2d ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing Model Rule 1.7).
65. But cf. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 935-38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980). There, a father retained a lawyer to represent himself and his two
minor daughters in an action brought on behalf of the daughters for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident with a third party. Id at 927. The other driver counter-
claimed against the two daughters. Id. The jury returned a verdict indicating that the
daughter-driver was negligent, whereas the daughter-passenger was not. Id. at 927-28.
The court indicated that the daughter-passenger clearly should have been advised to
bring a separate action against the daughter-driver and indirectly against the father,
who owned the car and the insurance policy. Id at 935. It is not inconceivable that
the same lawyer who represented all three family members might have attempted to
bring such an action in an attempt to recover damages for the daughter-passenger
from the father's insurance policy, thus invoking Model Rule 1.7(a). Cf., e.g., Gibson
v. Gibson, 479 P.2d, 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (abrogating parental immunity in action
brought by unemancipated minor against father for injuries sustained in automobile
accident). Of course, insurance companies are unlikely to permit representation of an
insured by the same attorney who represents the complainant.
66. See, e.g., 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.7:301 (stating that Model Rule
1.7(b) applies "at almost every turn").
67. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 6 (applied, as amended, until the adop-
tion of the Model Code in 1970). This narrow view of a conflict of interests continued
to define conflicts for many lawyers even under the subsequently adopted Canon 5 of
the Model Code, which was intended to broaden the definition of a potentially imper-
missible conflict. Moore, supra note 3, at 218 n.29; see Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 939
(quoting Canon 6's definition of a conflict in a case governed by Canon 5 of the Code)
(Weick, J., dissenting). Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules is "a direct descendent of
Canon 5 of the Code." Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.7:301.
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more appropriate question, however, is whether there is any substan-
tial risk that the lawyer's representation of either client would be ad-
versely affected, either because the lawyer is not free to consider
recommending courses of action that would be adverse to the other
client (in violation of the lawyer's duty of independent judgment) or
because the lawyer may unconsciously favor one client over the other
(in violation of the lawyer's duty of loyalfy, including the duty to
maintain confidences).68 Under this broader view of what constitutes
a potentially impermissible conflict, situations likely to be covered in-
dude either parent and child or co-respondents in juvenile court pro-
ceedings, 69 multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants in civil
litigation,70 multiple siblings in custody, abuse and neglect, or termina-
tion of parental rights cases,71 and the rare instance in which a lawyer
68. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7 cnit. 4; see also 1 Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 64, § 1.7:301 (stating that Model Rule 1.7 "seeks to ensure that a lawyer's
range of options on behalf of A are not limited by responsibilities that the lawyer also
owes to B, whether B is another client, a third party, or the lawyer herself"); Moore,
supra note 3, at 219-20 (noting that where a lawyer represents multiple clients, "his
ability to render independent professional judgment on behalf of each is immediately
affected").
69. See, e.g., HIA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Juvenile
Justice Standards: Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties Standard 3.2
commentary, at 85 [hereinafter Juvenile Justice Standards Project] (stating that appli-
cation of conflicts principles "ordinarily should lead counsel to avoid representation
of both parent and child or more than one party in juvenile court matters"). For a
detailed discussion of the differing interests between criminal codefendants, see
Moore, supra note 3, at 271-86.
70. See, e.g., Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 935-36 (noting potential conflict where a law-
yer represented two minor sisters in action against third party and one sister had
potential cause of action against the other). See generally Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 209 (Tentative Draft No. 3,1990) (addressing the represen-
tation of parties with conflicting interests in civil litigation); Wolfram, supra note 2,
§ 7.3.3 (discussing conflicts that may arise between coparties in litigation). There is
almost always at least a potential conflict of interests between coplaintiffs or code-
fendants in litigation, if only because of the possibility of disagreement regarding pos-
sible settlement offers. Even if the parties are unlikely to disagree, their
circumstances may differ sufficiently that an attorney exercising independent judg-
ment would clearly consider recommending different approaches to settlement and
other litigation decisions.
71. See, e.g., In re T.E., 582 A.2d 160, 163 (Vt. 1990) (observing that single attor-
ney properly represented both children until conflict was created by one child seeking
to be adopted, at which time children were represented by separate attorneys). The
identification of a potentially impermissible conflict in these cases depends initially on
(1) whether the lawyer is acting as an advocate or as a guardian ad litem, and (2) even
when the lawyer is acting as an advocate, whether her role is considered to be repre-
senting either the best interests or the desires of the individual children. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text. As with multiple parties in civil litigation, an attor-
ney exercising independent judgment could better explore the potential for disagree-
ment among the siblings, as well as better identify circumstances that call for different
strategies or outcomes for different siblings.
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is asked to represent both parent and child in a matter involving fam-
ily reorganization or an allegation of parental misconduct.72
Having identified a potentially impermissible conflict, the lawyer
should next determine whether the conflict is one which can be cured
by obtaining the consent of the clients or whether it is "non-consent-
able. ' 73 Under Model Rule 1.7(b), a conflict is non-consentable un-
less "the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected."'74 Regarding adult clients, non-consentable con-
flicts are uncommon,75 but generally include conflicts between adver-
saries in the same litigation (a form of direct adversity), multiple
parties to the same transaction whose interests or positions are funda-
mentally antagonistic, 76 and other situations where joint representa-
tion may be "objectively inadequate despite a client's voluntary and
informed consent. '7 7 On the other hand, it is usually permissible for a
lawyer to represent multiple parties whose interests are generally
aligned,78 although subsequent events may necessitate the lawyer's
withdrawal.79
72. See, e.g., In re Lackey, 390 N.E.2d 519, 523 (IlM. App. Ct. 1979) (reversing ter-
mination of parental rights because parents were represented by public defender who
also appeared in proceedings as guardian ad litem for child), aff'd, 405 N.E.2d 748 (Ill.
1980). At the very least, counsel for the child must be free to consider the possibility
that the child's interests diverge from those of the parent or parents. See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
73. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 & cmt. g (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 4, 1991).
74. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(b); see also Model Rules, supra note 1,
Rule 1.7(a) (conflict non-consentable unless "the lawyer reasonably believes the rep-
resentation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client"). See gener-
ally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 (Preliminary Draft No.
4, 1991) ("Notwithstanding each affected client's consent, a lawyer may not represent
a client if: (a) The lawyer represents an opposing party in the same litigation; (b) One
or more of the clients is legally incapable of giving consent; or (c) Special circum-
stances render it unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representa-
tion to one or more clients."); 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.7:305 (noting that
a lawyer should not request or accept client waivers, unless she is independently satis-
fied that the representation will not be adversely affected); Wolfram, supra note 2,
§ 7.2.3 (discussing consentable conflicts).
75. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 cmt. g (Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 1991). Some decisions take a broader approach to identification of non-
consentable conflicts. The position taken by the Restatement, however, "is that in
most circumstances concern for client autonomy warrants respecting a client's in-
formed consent." Id. reporter's note cmt. g(ii). For a discussion of the justifications
for paternalism in at least some cases, see Moore, supra note 3, at 233-40.
76. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 51:301 (1987).
77. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 cmt. g(iii) (Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 4, 1991).
78. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 51:301 (1987).
79. Cf. Jedwabny v. Phila. Tramp. Co., 135 A.2d 252 (Pa. 1957) (where owner-
driver and two guests, all represented by same attorney, sued transportation company
for injuries sustained in accident with streetcar, subsequently, defendant joined
owner-driver as additional defendant and filed motion to disqualify common attorney
from representing owner-driver as defendant), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958).
[Vol. 641834
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
Under these standards, the situations described above would not
necessarily involve non-consentable conflicts-that is, if all of the cli-
ents were adults. The fact that one or more of the clients is a child,
however, cannot be ignored. Indeed, it is extremely relevant in deter-
mining (1) the capacity of the client to give a valid consent; (2) the
identity of an appropriate surrogate decision maker, when necessary;
and (3) whether a particular conflict ought to be considered non-con-
sentable precisely because one or more of the clients is a child.
According to the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Re-
statement"), each client whose consent is required must have the
"legal capacity to give consent," and thus, any "[c]onsent of a person
under a legal disability... normally must be obtained from a guardian
or a conservator appointed for the person."80 As for children, the Re-
statement further asserts that "[c]onsent of a minor normally is effec-
tive when given by a parent or guardian of the minor."'" When the
parent is not one of the other clients being represented by the law-
yer-for example, if the lawyer is asked to represent multiple co-re-
spondents in a juvenile proceeding or both the client and a third
person as coplaintiffs or codefendants in civil litigation-then securing
the parent's consent on behalf of the child might not be problematic, sz
at least when the child and parent agree on the desirability of retain-
ing a lawyer burdened with a potential conflict of interests. 3
There will be times, however, when child and parent disagree. Take
the example of two adolescent friends charged as co-respondents in a
delinquency proceeding or codefendants in a civil tort action. They
might be determined to present a united front, aided by a common
attorney,84 whereas at least one set of parents might be equally deter-
80. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 cmt. g(ii) (Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 4, 1991).
81. Id.
82. But see Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 927, 939-41 (6th Cir.) (holding inva-
lid father's consent to single attorney's representation of two plaintiff-daughters
where attorney failed to disclose possibility that one daughter would have claim
against the other), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
83. Of course, one of the reasons a child does not disagree with the parent might
be that the child does not understand the nature or significance of the conflict. See,
e.g., Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics: A Report of Six Inter-
views, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1763, 1768 (1996) (stating that children interviewed were
not at all concerned about potential adverse effects of a lawyer representing conflict-
ing interests). Lawyers may have a duty under some circumstances to consult with the
child directly, especially if the child is mature enough to appreciate the situation. See
infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. If the matter is in litigation, the lawyer
might also have a duty to inform the court of the conflict so that the court can deter-
mine whether to appoint or substitute a guardian ad litem for the child. See infra notes
90-93 and accompanying text.
84. For a detailed discussion of the possible benefits of joint representation of
codefendants, see Moore, supra note 3, at 251-56. Cf. Nancy J. Moore, Disqualifica-
tion of an Attorney Representing Multiple Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics
and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1979) (discussing the benefits
of joint representation of witnesses of grand jury investigations).
18351996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
mined to obtain separate counsel on behalf of their child, perhaps in
the hope of negotiating favorable treatment or shifting the blame to
the other child.8 5 Moreover, the parents might well claim that as
guardians of their children, it is their right to choose the attorney who
will represent their child.
The right of parents to engage in decision making on behalf of their
children will be more fully discussed later in this Article, in a section
addressing a parent's role in not only selecting a particular attorney,
but also in all of the other decisions to be made in the course of the
representation.8 6 Here, it may be sufficient to note, first, that the va-
lidity and scope of parental rights (as opposed to the rights of chil-
dren) are highly contested17 and, second, that although there are
clearly some areas in which parents will control the decision-making
process, this will not always be the case.88 Indeed, there are some
situations-for example, delinquency proceedings and civil cases
where a parent has a competing financial interest in the subject of the
lawsuit-where courts are virtually certain to reject a parent's right to
decide (in opposition to the child's wishes) whether to consent to a
potentially impermissible conflict of interests on the part of an attor-
ney retained or appointed to represent a child. 9
Even if parents do not have an exclusive right to select an attorney
for their child, this does not necessarily mean that the right belongs to
the child herself. On the contrary, it should also be considered
whether, at a minimum, a surrogate decision maker ought to be ap-
pointed or whether the particular conflict ought rather to be deemed
non-consentable in the absence of agreement between parent and
child. For example, take the case of the two adolescent friends
charged as corespondents or codefendants. Because the parents
might be motivated (even unconsciously) by factors other than the
best interest of the child, such as embarrassment or inconvenience or
even a belief that the child deserves to be taught a lesson,90 a court
could determine that it is not the parent's right to decide whether joint
representation should proceed. Nevertheless, the court might not be
prepared to leave such an important decision to the minor alone.
Although minors may have the "legal capacity" to retain an attorney
of their own choosing in at least some circumstances, 9 many decisions
85. Cfi, e.g., Moore, supra note 3, at 271-79 (stating course of action an independ-
ent attorney might consider in multiple representation of criminal codefendants);
Moore, supra note 84 (discussing multiple representation of grand jury witnesses).
86. See infra part IV.
87. See infra part IV.
88. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
90. See Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.2 commen-
tary, at 85-87; Fink, supra note 37, at 123.
91. As noted earlier, the Restatement states that with respect to the representation
of potentially impermissible conflicts of interest, each client whose consent is required
must have the "legal capacity" to consent. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying
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insist (at least in litigation) that the court must satisfy itself not only
that the particular minor is capable of choosing, but also that the mi-
nor has in fact selected competent counsel.92 Given that the adoles-
cent friends have chosen counsel burdened with a potentially
impermissible conflict of interests, the court could appoint one or
more guardians ad litem for the purpose of determining whether the
joint representation in this case is in the best interests of each child.
Alternatively, the court could find that the dangers of multiple repre-
sentation in a delinquency proceeding are so considerable that absent
parental consent, the conflict ought to be deemed non-consentable.93
text. Unfortunately, it is unclear what "legal capacity" means in this context. On the
one hand, the Restatement asserts that "[c]onsent of a minor normally is effective
when given by a parent or guardian of the minor." See supra note 81 and accompany-
ing text. However, this assertion ignores the complexities of the law relating to mi-
nors. For example, contracts entered into by minors are typically voidable, not void,
and are, in any event, fully enforceable against the minor when the contract concerns
"necessary" goods and services. See, e.g., 1 Kramer, supra note 16, § 10.01-.02 (dis-
cussing the right of a minor to disaffirm a contract, as well as exceptions to the rule).
Contracts between minors and attorneys have been enforced against minors under the
doctrine of "necessities," as well as other theories. See generally E.R. Tan, Annota-
tion, Infant's Liability for Services Rendered by Attorney at Law Under Contract With
Him, 13 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1967) (discussing cases in which the infant may be held liable
to pay for legal services). Moreover, contract doctrine aside, courts have increasingly
recognized a minor's right to engage counsel of the minor's own choice, at least where
the minor is capable of choosing and has selected competent counsel. See, e.g., In re
A.W., 618 N.E.2d 729,733-34 (IlM. App. Ct.) (granting 13-year-old's motion to substi-
tute for appointed guardian an attorney of her own choice in dispute following adjudi-
cation of wardship; minor was sufficiently mature and competent in making decision),
cert denied, 624 N.E.2d 811 (1993); Fargnoli v. Faber, 481 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (App.
Div. 1984) (affirming family court ruling that children have the right to select impar-
tial representation free from parental intervention).
92. See, e.g., Akkiko M. v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that lower court, in proceedings concerning education of 10-year-old
dependent of juvenile court, erred in barring representation by counsel of minor's
choice without first ruling that child was not capable of choosing or did not select
competent counsel).
93. See, e.g., Fargnoli, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (refusing to permit'children in custody
proceeding to be represented by lawyers who had previously represented the
mother). While the mother in Fargnoli presumably was willing to give her consent,
she was not only a party to the proceeding, but a party with interests clearly in conflict
with the minor children. Indeed it was this very conflict of interests between the
mother and her children that warranted separate representation of the children in the
first place. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
The purpose of permitting adult clients to consent to the representation of conflict-
ing interests is not only to allow them to secure the benefits of joint representation,
but also to do otherwise would fail to respect their autonomous right to decide for
themselves whether the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks. Moore, supra
note 3, at 233-40. Of course, paternalism is often justified in the case of children, on
the ground that they lack the capacity to engage in effective decision making on their
own behalf. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in Philosophy, Politics, and Soci-
ety 78, 88-89 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979) (using the example of chil-
dren as a paradigm for determining when paternalism might be justified in the case of
adults). The difficulty here is deciding whether, and if so, when, children should be
deemed to be capable of engaging in effective decision making and thus entitled to
have their autonomy respected. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining
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Not surprisingly, these difficulties in conflicts evaluation are sub-
stantially increased when the parent is also a prospective client. Here,
even when there is no disagreement between parent and child, the fact
that the normal decision maker on behalf of the child (that is, the
parent) is the other interested client suggests that there may be a need
for a surrogate decision maker.94 In some circumstances, however,
this additional layer of protection may be unnecessarily burdensome
and intrusive. For example, both parent and child may be suing a
third person to recover damages from an accident in which both were
injured.95 Although there is at least the potential for conflicts of inter-
ests between parent and child, their interests are generally aligned;
therefore, the advantages of retaining a single lawyer are obvious and
seem clearly to outweigh any potential for harm.96 Absent some rea-
son to suspect that the parent is not acting in the best interests of the
the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399, 1406-07 (1996) (stating
that the principle of adult autonomy is wholly inapplicable with regard to young chil-
dren and only partially applicable to older children, depending on their maturity or
competence).
94. Cf Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 202 cmt. g(ii) (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 4, 1991) ("When the person who normally would make the deci-
sion whether or not to give consent-members of a corporate board of directors, for
example-is the other interested client of the lawyer, special arrangements must be
made to constitute an independent person or body empowered to consider whether or
not to.consent.").
95. In France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970), a father and his
two children, by their father as guardian ad litem, sued defendants for personal inju-
ries and property damages as a result of a crash between an automobile owned and
operated by the father and a tractor-trailer. Id. at 491. In a second action, the father
sued as administrator of the estate of his wife, who had died in the accident, in a
wrongful death action for the benefit of the husband and the two surviving children.
Id. The case was further complicated by a counterclaim against the father for all sums
due to the estate of his wife, thus raising the doctrine of intrafamily immunity. Id.
Absent the counterclaim, the primary conflict between the father and his children
concerned the allocation of any settlement funds. See, e.g., Auerbach v. McKinney,
549 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (where parent seeks compensation
from same settlement funds as child, guardian ad litem must be appointed for the
child prior to court approval of the settlement).
Parents are also parties in their own right when they sue for damages derivative to
injuries to the child. See, e.g., Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975) (describ-
ing medical malpractice action in which parents sued both on behalf of their injured
child and on their own behalf for loss of consortium of child).
96. The primary areas of potential conflict include the possibility of a counterclaim
by the defendant against the parent or even a direct action by the child against the
parent, assuming that intrafamily immunities have been abolished, and allocating any
settlement funds. See supra note 95. The court will have to approve any settlement on
behalf of a minor, and many courts will insist on the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for the child whenever the parent is seeking compensation from the same settle-
ment funds as the child. See supra note 95. Nevertheless, given the parties' common
interests in establishing the negligence of the defendant, it seems overly burdensome
to routinely require two separate attorneys in any case in which a parent and child are
coplaintiffs in a personal injury action. Thus, it is not surprising that courts do not
routinely appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor plaintiff upon the filing of a com-
plaint in such an action. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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child in consenting to the dual representation, routine appointment of
a guardian ad litem for that express purpose is unwarranted, 97 particu-
larly since the court is in a position to replace the parent as next friend
in the event any significant conflict develops.98
There are other situations in which the mere potential for conflict
should not prevent a parent from consenting to joint representation
on behalf of both parent and child. For example, lawyers are often
consulted by parents for advice on legal problems involving both
themselves and their children, such as issues relating to education for
children with disabilities (in which the relevant legislation explicitly
grants rights to both the children and their parents). 99 Litigation is
typically only a last resort, and thus the court's protection may never
be invoked. Nevertheless, if the interests of both clients appear to be
compatible and there is no reason to believe that the 'parent is not
acting in the child's best interests, 100 then once again it seems both
unwarranted and overly intrusive to require either a surrogate deci-
sion maker or separate legal representation.' 0 ' Here, it is up to the
lawyer to be alert to changing circumstances, to bring any developing
conflicts to the attention of the clients, and to be prepared to with-
97. Cf. infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text (noting that according to one
proposal, absent a conflict of interest, parents might be presumed to be the appropri-
ate decision maker in the legal representation of their children).
98. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey v. O'Donnell, 702 F.
Supp. 513, 515-16 (D. Pa. 1987) (where parents in home schooling case successfully
resisted defendants' move to have guardian ad litem appointed for minor children;
court agreed that parents were natural guardians and that if an actual conflict of inter-
est arose, a guardian ad litem could b6 appointed).
99. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 610-11 (D. Md. 1993) (discuss-
ing federal legislation that grants rights to the child's parents to challenge matters
relating to the child). But cf. Miller v. W. Lafayette Community Sch. Corp., 645
N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)' (holding that representation by attorney-par-
ent in IDEA action was not pro se representation; sole client was child, and thus child
was entitled to recover attorney's fees). See generally 3 James A. Rapp, Education
Law § 10.03[2][h] (1995) (detailing who has standing to bring suit under the Rehabili-
tation Act and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act).
100. Cf. infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text (noting one proposal which sug-
gests that absent a conflict of interest, there is a rebuttable presumption that the par-
ent is the appropriate decision maker).
101. Another alternative would be for the attorney to represent either the parent
or the child and have the other party go unrepresented. This alternative can be dan-
gerous because the unrepresented person often relies on the attorney to protect his or
her interest, and it can be very difficult for the attorney to avoid giving legal advice to
the unrepresented person. However, giving such legal advice would not only violate
disciplinary rules, see, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 4.3 cmt. (stating that
"[d]uring the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not
give advice to an unrepresented person. other than the advice to obtain counsel"), but
also might subject the attorney to liability for any negligence. See, e.g., Moore, supra
note 27, at 699 (detailing the "gratuitous undertaking" theory of third-party liability).
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draw in the event that the positions of the clients become fundamen-
tally antagonistic.10 2
At the other extreme, there are certainly some circumstances in
which the potential for conflict is so strong (and the consequences of
inadequate representation so severe) that any proposed joint repre-
sentation ought simply to be prohibited. An obvious example is a law-
yer who is asked to represent both parent and child in a delinquency
proceeding involving the child.' 3 If the parent is either directly or
indirectly responsible for the initiation of charges, then the conflict of
interest is both apparent and irreconcilable, particularly if the parent
will be the complaining witness.' 04 Even where the parent did not
initiate the charges, the parent may have interests contrary to the best
interests of the child. Thus, parents may be motivated by a desire to
teach the child a lesson or they may be "largely disinterested or apa-
thetic toward the proceedings."'0 5 Even where there is no immedi-
ately observable hostility, the likelihood of a significant conflict
developing is at the same time considerable and difficult to assess at
the outset of the proceeding. For all these'reasons, the risk of harm to
the child of dual representation is clearly substantial. Moreover, while
there are obvious benefits to having a single lawyer represent multiple
co-respondents in a juvenile proceeding (which may outweigh the
equally obvious potential for harm),"0 6 it is difficult to see any particu-
lar advantage to the child of having the parent represented by the
same attorney. In the rare case in which the lawyer is convinced that
there might be such an advantage-for example, when assuring the
confidentiality of communications between parent and lawyer is criti-
cal to obtaining information vital to the child's defense' 7 -then the
102. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule .1.16(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer must
withdraw if continuing representation will result in violation of rules of professional
conduct).
103. An even more obvious example would be any attempt by a lawyer to represent
both parents and children in a dependency procedure, although such attempts must
be rare. See Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children
in Dependency Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1857, 1868 (1996) (no court has permitted
joint representation in this situation).
104. See, e.g., Juvenile Justine Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.2 com-
mentary, at 85-86 (noting that according to empirical study of juvenile courts in three
cities, parents initiated such proceedings in 17% of delinquency cases in one city and
in 11% of the cases in the other two cities).
105. Id. at 86 (citation omitted); see also Fink, supra note 37, at 122 (stating that
"[a] parent may... instruct counsel not to seek immediate bail or pretrial release to
'teach the child a lesson' ").
106. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
107. Ordinarily, a nonclient parent's communications with the attorney would not
be covered by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, and while such communica-
tions would be covered under the professional rule of confidentiality, disclosures
could be made for the benefit of the child. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying
text. It is at least conceivable that there will be cases in which in order to secure
communications essential to the effective defense of the child, the parent would need
additional assurances of confidentiality, in which case the parent would need to enter
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court can consider appointing a guardian ad litem to render consent
on behalf of the child.
III. CoNFLiCrs OF INTERESTS PART II: OTFmR FORMS OF
MATERIAL LIMITATION
Although potentially impermissible conflicts most frequently arise
when a lawyer simultaneously represents two or more clients, a law-
yer's representation of a child client can also be jeopardized by the
lawyer's duties to a noncient or by the lawyer's own interests. 08
Both situations are generally addressed using the same conflicts analy-
sis approach suggested above.
For lawyers representing adults, the most common form of duties to
noncients are the lawyer's continuing obligations of loyalty and confi-
dentiality to former clients. Thus, under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules,
lawyers are absolutely precluded from undertaking representation ad-
verse to a former client in a substantially related matter (except with
the consent of the former client).10 9 Even when the representation is
not clearly adverse, or where the matters are not substantially related,
Model Rule 1.7(b) requires lawyers to identify situations in which
their continuing obligations to a former client may materially limit
their representation of a present client.1 0 Thus, a lawyer who has for-
merly represented a parent in an abuse or neglect proceeding might
not be precluded under Rule 1.9 from representing the child in a sub-
sequent delinquency proceeding;"' nevertheless, a potentially imper-
missible conflict will arise under Rule 1.7(b) if the lawyer has
confidential information about the parent that the lawyer would be
into an attorney-client relationship with either the lawyer representing the child or
another lawyer. There may be reasons, financial or otherwise, why the parent either
cannot or will not retain a separate lawyer.
108. See supra note 63. Under Model Rule 1.7(b), there is a potentially impermissi-
ble conflict of interests whenever the representation of a client "may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests ... ." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis added).
109. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.9(a). Rule 1.9(a) states: "A lawyer who has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person
in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are mate-
rially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation." See generally 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.9:103 (detail-
ing the approach under the Model Rules); Wolfram, supra note 2, § 7.4.3 (discussing
Model Rule 1.9(a)).
110. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(b); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995) (discussing lawyers' limita-
tions resulting from responsibilities to former clients).
111. Under Rule 1.9(a), the representation is not prohibited unless the matters are
"substantially related," and the new client's interests "are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.9(a). Unless the
two matters arose from the same underlying events or a pattern of events, it is un-
likely that a court would find that they are substantially related. Nor is it clear that




precluded from using to the child's advantage.1 1 2 As in multiple rep-
resentation, the most difficult question to answer will be whether and
under what circumstances the present client (the child) or a surrogate
can effectively consent to the conflict of interests, particularly when
the former client is the very parent who would normally be expected
to give such consent on behalf of the child." 3
For lawyers representing children, a more common example of a
possible conflict arising from duties to nonclients is the lawyer in a
child custody, abuse or neglect, or a termination of parental rights
case who serves both as the child's attorney and as guardian ad li-
tern."' As previously discussed, the guardian ad litem is traditionally
viewed an agent of the court, to which she owes her primary duty of
allegiance." 5 The attorney, however, is the child's representative and,
as such, will typically be expected to advocate the child's wishes and
desires, except perhaps when the child is very young." 6 Clearly there
will be some circumstances in which the guardian's duty to the court
may materially limit the lawyer's ability to effectively represent the
child as client." 7 Moreover, as there is clearly no one to give effective
consent on behalf of the child, it is virtually certain that the only
proper resolution of this particular conflict is to separate the two roles
112. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.9(c) (stating that a lawyer who has
formerly represented a client shall not thereafter "use information relating to the rep-
resentation to the disadvantage of the former client" or "reveal information relating
to the representation"); see also Fink, supra note 37, at 123-24 (discussing the Com-
mentary to Standard § 3.132 of the Standards for Administration of Juvenile Justice,
which requires separate counsel in cases where lawyer had represented parents in
child protective, custody, or supervision matter).
113. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
114. See G.Y. v. State, 486 N.W.2d 288, 289 (Iowa 1992); In re Baby Girl Baxter,
479 N.E.2d 257,260 (Ohio 1985); In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45,53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991);
see also Kollsman v. Cohen, 996 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the differ-
ence between an attorney ad litem and a guardian ad litem). This is a common prac-
tice; indeed one that is explicitly sanctioned in some statutes. See, e.g., G.Y., 486
N.W.2d at 289 (" 'The same person may serve both as the child's counsel and as
guardian ad litem" [, but] the court may appoint a separate guardian ad litem, if the
same person cannot properly represent the legal interests of the child as legal counsel
and.., as guardian ad litem.'" (quoting Iowa Code § 232.89(4) (1989))).
115. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. Cf., e.g., In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d at 260 (stating that the attorney-
guardian for incompetent parent elicited testimony harmful to her stated desire to
avoid termination of parental rights; failure of attorney to bring conflict in roles to
attention of court warranted reversal of termination); see also In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d
at 52-54 (following Baxter in case where lawyer served as both attorney and guardian
ad litem of multiple siblings, and where as guardian" ad litem, attorney did not concur
with desire of all but one of the children to return home). But see G.Y., 486 N.W.2d at
289 (holding that separate counsel is not required where child's wishes conflict with
counsel's view of child's best interest).
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and appoint either a new lawyer or a new guardian ad litem on the
child's behalf."'
Aside from duties to nonclients, lawyers' own interests may impinge
on the representation of a client. This is one of the most difficult types
of conflict to monitor, as lawyers are understandably reluctant to re-
veal all the various ways in which they might be tempted to sacrifice a
client's interest for their own. Moreover, while lawyers routinely re-
veal their own financial interests in the subject matter of the represen-
tation, they are less likely to disclose other types of personal
interests." 9 For example, attorneys in juvenile court are often court
appointed, and their concern for continued reappointment in future
cases might well impact their willingness to take action on behalf of a
client if the judge clearly disapproves. 20 Similarly, lawyers who work
for child advocacy organizations often have strong ideological views
about the best interests of children generally, which may not be con-
sistent with best interests of a particular child.' 2' The temptation to
represent a "cause" rather than a client is particularly strong in class
action litigation, where most of the clients (or their parents) will never
be consulted." Moreover, the problem is clearly exacerbated when
the clients are minors, particularly if, as discussed below, the situation
is one in which there is no adult decision maker interposed between
118. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d at 260 (stating that the court
should not hesitate to grant request of attorney to withdraw as guardian when attor-
ney feels there is a conflict with his role as attorney). But see G.Y., 486 N.W.2d at 289
(stating that where child's wishes conflict with counsel's view of child's best interest,
court must be informed but separate counsel not required; court was concerned that
"duplicitous arguments" were "wholly unnecessary, and an obvious waste of the pub-
lic treasury").
119. Conflicts resulting from a lawyer's self-interest are the least analyzed of all the
conflicts arising under Model Rule 1.7(b) and its predecessors. See 1 Hazard &
Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.7:309 (providing only one illustration of conflict involving
lawyer self-interest); Wolfram, supra note 2, § 7.1.1 (only briefly mentioning that
there are many possible ways in which lawyer's interests might conflict with client's).
Nevertheless, lawyers who have a financial interest in the subject matter of the repre-
sentation are often viewed as entering into a business transaction with the client, a
conflict which is separately analyzed under 1.8(a) and its predecessor, Disciplinary
Rule 5-104 of the Model Code. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.8(a); Model Code,
supra note 1, DR 5-104. These types of conflicts have received extensive attention in
the literature. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.8:200-203, at 262-65; Wolf-
ram, supra note 2, § 8.11.
120. See Bailey & Rothblatt, supra note 38, § 2:4.
121. See, e.g., Alison M. Brumley, Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in
Federal Court, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 333, 346 n.62 (1991) ("In the decision to litigate
there is the concern that the child serves as a plaintiff for some third party more
interested in establishing precedent than in protecting the child's best interests." (cita-
tion omitted)); Hafen, supra note 7, at 447 ("The impetus behind an attorney disre-
garding parental direction may be the attorney's desire to promote a particular
cause.").
122. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law
Reform, and Public Policy (1985). This volume addresses the many complex ques-
tions regarding test-case litigation on behalf of children. The book includes five de-
tailed studies of test-case litigation, some of which were class action lawsuits.
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the lawyer and the child client.'23 As with adult clients with disabili-
ties, lawyers can exercise enormous power over clients who are chil-
dren, 24 and attorneys can use the power to steer the litigation in their
own desired directions. Unfortunately, there is very little that is pres-
ently done under rules of professional conduct to monitor these con-
flicts effectively." 5
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS PART III: PARENTS AS INTERESTED
THIRD PERSONS
Perhaps the most difficult (but fascinating) conflicts dilemmas for
lawyers representing children are those which stem from a parent's
role as an interested third person-that is, a person who typically not
only hires and pays the lawyer to represent the child, 2 6 but also ex-
pects to be an active participant and decision maker in the course of
the representation. Under standard conflicts analysis, a lawyer may
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816(1977) (discussing the conflicts that arise between the attorney representing the child
and the child's parents). The litigation is extensively discussed as one of five case
studies in Mnookin, supra note 122, at 68-147. It is also discussed in Hafen, supra
note 7, at 452-53.
124. See Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics
and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609, 622 (1989). Even if the client's
handicap does not affect his or her mental ability, it can affect the client psychologi-
cally, thus impairing the client's ability to direct the course of the representation. See
Neely, supra note 31, at 1365 & n.29.
125. It is certainly not the case, as Hafen suggests, that lawyers can ethically justify
advocating a "cause" even when it is directly contrary to the interests of a child client.
See Hafen, supra note 7, at 456-57 (relying on the preamble to the Model Rules,
which states that "a lawyer should seek improvement of the law"). Such conduct
would clearly violate Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3, which prescribe competent and diligent
representation of clients, including "commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rules 1.1, 1.3 & cmt. The more likely scena-
rio, however, is that the lawyer will be personally convinced that the "cause" she
advocates is indeed in the best interests of the particular child client. Despite Model
Rule 1.7(b), which requires the attorney to disclose any commitment to a cause that
might influence the lawyer to act contrary to the client's best interest, see supra note
63 and accompanying text, it is difficult to determine how strong the lawyer's commit-
ment would need to be before disclosure is required. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra
note 64, § 1.7:309, at 255 (providing an illustration about how a lawyer's concern for
his own reputation implies a requirement of disclosure and consent, but only after
lawyer himself has acknowledged concern that his reputation will be tarnished by
undertaking the proposed representation). If the lawyer is convinced that there is no
real risk that such commitment will interfere with zealous representation, then the
lawyer is highly unlikely to believe that any disclosure is required. Of course, even if
disclosure were required, it is unclear who, if anyone, could effectively consent on the
child's behalf. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
126. In some circumstances, courts have even directed parents to pay for a lawyer
selected by either the court or the child. To protect the independence of the attorney,
some commentators have cautioned against parental payment, including reimburse-
ment of court-appointed counsel. See Fink, supra note 37, at 123 (citing IJA-ABA
Juvenile Justice Standards). Nevertheless, there are jurisdictions that require parents
to pay for counsel if they are financially able or to otherwise assume the cost of their
children's representation. See id.
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accept compensation from someone other than the client (usually an
insurance company or an employer)' 27 only if the lawyer (1) obtains
the client's informed consent, and (2) avoids any form of interference
by the third party payor in the representation. 12 Moreover, even if a
nonclient third person is not paying for the lawyer, it is generally im-
proper either to permit such a person to direct or influence the law-
yer's independent judgment 2 9 or for the lawyer to share confidential
information with such person except with the consent of the client.'
3 0
When the client is a child and the interested third person is the parent,
it is far from clear to what extent this standard analysis applies.
First, there is the problem of obtaining an effective consent to the
third-party payment from a client who is a child. As previously dis-
cussed in regard to the multiple representation of parent and child,'
3 1
the obvious difficulty is that the normal decision maker (the parent) is
the very person whose possibly conflicting interests (arising here from
the third party payment) suggest the need for the child client's consent
in the first place. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that mi-
nors typically have no financial resources of their own; thus, it would
be nearly impossible to determine if consent given by even a mature
minor was truly voluntary.3 2 Nevertheless, it is absurd to suggest that
parents cannot (or should not) routinely retain and pay a lawyer to
127. See Wolfram, supra note 2, §§ 84.1, 8.8.2. Conflicts of interests in representa-
tion involving insurance companies are often complicated by the expectation of some
insurance companies that the lawyer is representing both the insurance company and
the insured. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.7:304. This is sometimes, but
less frequently true, with respect to employer-payers.
128. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.8(0. Rule 1.8(0 states:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of profes-
sional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as re-
quired by Rule 1.6.
Id.; see also Model Code, supra note 1, DR 5-107 (providing a similar standard for
compensation by third parties). See generally Wolfram, supra note 2, § 8.8.2 (discuss-
ing the Model Rules' and Model Code's requirements for third-party payors, and
highlighting situations where the third party is the client's employer or where the
client is indigent); I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 64, § 1.8:701 (same).
129. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7 cmt. (commenting that loyalty will be
impaired whenever the interests of the lawyer or another person will "materially in-
terfere with the- lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives").
130. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.6.
131. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
132. Cf. Moore, supra note 3, at 244 (noting the importance of determining whether
"a client's attempted consent is the result of either psychological or economic coer-
cion (or perhaps simply an attempt to avoid offending either the other client or the
lawyer), rather than a voluntary decision to encounter known risks in order to obtain
a potential benefit" (footnote omitted)).
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represent their child.'33 Perhaps this is because in the ordinary case
(that is, excluding cases of inherent conflict such as custody, abuse or
neglect, and termination of parental rights), parents are expected not
only to "foot the bill,"'13 4 but also to play an active role in directing the
course of the representation. Whether these expectations are justified
is another question.
Standard conflicts analysis does not clearly envision or even provide
for any such primary role for the parent of a child client. Under Rule
1.8(f) of the Model Rules, a lawyer may not accept compensation
from someone other than the client (even with the client's consent)
unless "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."' 35 In
addition, "information relating to representation of a client" must be
protected from improper use or disclosure. 36 Neither the text nor the
comment mentions any exception for parents of a client who is a child.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine this rule being applied to par-
ents in all circumstances. For example, in litigation where the parent
is bringing suit on behalf of the child, the parent's role as guardian,
next friend, or guardian ad litem ordinarily contemplates that the par-
ent (or any other adult authorized to bring the lawsuit) will be making
decisions on the child's behalf, even though it is the child who is the
actual client of the lawyer. 137 Similarly, aside from civil litigation,
when a parent consults a lawyer on behalf of a young child, it is incon-
ceivable that the lawyer would not look to the parent for guidance in
most cases or that the parent would not reasonably expect the lawyer
to do so. For example, when the child is too young to express her
desires, the lawyer will almost always need to consult the parent to
determine what course of action might be in the child's best interests,
even if the parent is not actually directing the course of the represen-
tation. 3 Even when the child is old enough to express a preference
(and the lawyer's role is to advocate such preferences rather than
what the lawyer believes to be in the child's best interests), 39 the law-
yer should counsel the child according to the lawyer's independent
133. See Fink, supra note 37, at 123 (citing IA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards).
134. There are jurisdictions which require parents to pay for the separate represen-
tation of their children, even in cases involving extreme conflicts of interests. See
supra note 126.
135. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.8(f)(2). For the full text of this rule, see
supra note 128.
136. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.8(f)(3). For the full text of this rule, see
supra note 128.
137. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the argument that parents have a legal right to determine
the course of the representation, see infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
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professional judgment, which will often necessitate that the lawyer
consult parents and others knowledgeable about the child. 4 °
Of course, one answer to the Model Rule 1.8(f) dilemma is to rec-
ognize that if parents have the right to direct or influence the lawyer
representing their child, it is not because they are paying the lawyer's
fee, but rather because of their status as parents. Moreover, the con-
verse also must be true; that is, if parents have the right to direct or
influence the lawyer representing their child, then the fact that they
are paying her fee should not adversely affect that right. Neverthe-
less, the question remains whether and under what circumstances par-
ents have a right to participate in the legal representation of their
children.
As several commentators have already noted, current ethics codes
provide little guidance on this score.14 1 Thus, Rule 1.14 of the Model
Rules deals extensively -with the problem of decision making on behalf
of clients under a disability;142 however, neither the text of the rule
nor its accompanying comment explicitly refer to the role of parents in
the representation of their children. Moreover, although both the rule
and the comment acknowledge the existence of disabilities attributa-
ble to a child's status as a minor,143 their guidance seems to be di-
rected primarily to lawyers representing adult clients with mental or
physical disabilities. 144 As advocates for the adult-disabled are quick
140. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.3(c)
commentary (stating that securing parent's knowledge of matters relating to represen-
tation "often essential to effective counseling for the child"). Consulting with the
parents raises questions pertaining to both the confidentiality of information relating
to the child client and the confidentiality of information relating to the parents them-
selves. Older children may be able to consent to the lawyer's sharing information
with the parents. See id Standard 3.3(b) commentary (observing, however, that if the
child insists on nondisclosure, even when the lawyer counsels to the contrary, the
child's desires should be respected). With respect to very young children, see id. Stan-
dard 3.3(d)(i) (permitting disclosure if "such disclosure (1) will not disadvantage the
juvenile and (2) will further rendition of counseling, advice or other services to the
client").
141. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 7, at 447,451,455-62 (noting that Model Rules are
deficient in this area and making a proposal for change); Neely, supra note 31, at
1397-98 (highlighting similar deficiencies in the Model Code).
142. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14. For the full text of the rule, see infra
text accompanying note 147. For a discussion of the pertinent subsections in the com-
ment to the rule, see infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
143. The text of the rule acknowledges that "a client's ability to make adequately
considered decisions" can be impaired because of "minority," as well as "mental disa-
bility or for some other reason." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14. For a discus-
sion of the pertinent subsections in the comment to the rule, see infra notes 149-51
and accompanying text.
144. The reason for this is probably because both the rule and the comment focus
primarily on incapacity by reason of mental or physical impairment. Although minor-
ity may in fact impair a person's ability to make adequately considered decisions, it
does not always do so. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text (describing situa-
tions in which courts and legislatures have recognized minor's capacity to engage in
effective decision making). Moreover, minority has an aspect of purely legal incapac-
18471996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to point out, there is a world of difference between minority and other
forms of disability. 45 Indeed, one of the more striking differences
may be the extent to which the parents of a minor (but not an adult)
child can successfully claim a legal right to engage in decision making
on behalf of their child.1 46
Rule 1.14 provides as follows:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because
of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client:
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's
own interest. 147
Under subsection (a), minority is acknowledged as a form of disabil-
ity; it is unclear, however, whether the disability is one of strictly legal
incapacity, such as the lack of capacity to enter into legally binding
contracts, or simply an acknowledgment that minority, like mental or
physical disability, may in fact impair a client's "ability to make ade-
quately considered decisions."'148 The comment to the rule is similarly
confusing. Although it recognizes that "an incapacitated person may
have no power to make legally binding decisions," the comment goes
on to note that the law has recognized "intermediate degrees of com-
petence," referring explicitly to the tendency of courts to elicit the
opinions of children "as young as five or six years of age, and certainly
those of ten or twelve," in legal proceedings concerning their cus-
tody.149 One could readily conclude, as several commentators have,
that the rule presumes that children, particularly older children, who
have "the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclu-
ity, which is not present with regard to adults who are impaired but who have not
been judicially declared incompetent. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
145. See, for example, Herr, supra note 124, at 619 n.49, which states:
Unfortunately, by coupling the status of a child with that of a person with
mental disability, this comment may contribute to lawyers' stereotyped view
of persons with mental disabilities as child-like. The consequence of such
stereotypes and myths is the undermining of the respect normally accorded
an adult client and an increase in the frequency of condescending behavior.
146. See, e.g., id- at 628 ("Most jurisdictions do not permit family members to give
consent [to medical treatment] for disabled relatives who are over the age of
majority.").
147. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14. See generally 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra
note 64, § 1.14:100-303 (providing an in-depth analysis of Rule 1.14); Wolfram, supra
note 2, § 4.4, at 159 (discussing the lawyer's role with incompetent clients). There was
no counterpart to Rule 1.14 in the Model Code. See Model Code, supra note 1, EC 7-
11 to -12.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14 cmt. 1.
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sions about matters affecting [their] own well-being" 150 are not dis-
abled and thus have the right to make decisions on their own
behalf.15 1
Further, subsection (b) permits the lawyer to seek the appointment
of a guardian "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the cli-
ent cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.' 152 Lawyers
could reasonably conclude that a particular child has the cognitive
ability to act in her own interest, and thus no guardian is required.
153
Moreover, this conclusion has strong support in various court deci-
sions, as well as statutes, that acknowledge the capacity of mature mi-
nors to engage in effective decision making on their own behalf. Thus,
minors have been afforded the right to make their own decisions, in at
least some circumstances, concerning such important matters as re-
taining an attorney,154 accepting and refusing medical treatment,1
55
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Fmk, supra note 37, at 120 (noting that juveniles are capable of "con-
sidered judgment"); Hafen, supra note 7, at 459-61 (concluding that the comment
recognizes "intermediate degrees of competence"); cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1160 (1971) (stating that lawyer's duty in juve-
nile delinquency matters does not differ significantly from representation of adults
accused of crime); Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.1(b)
& commentary (stating that, in general, determinations of child's interests is child's
responsibility; if particular child is incapable of considered judgment, lawyer should
look to guardian ad litem or assume role herself, consulting with parents only if their
interests do not appear to conflict with child's).
152. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14(b).
153. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 37, at 120 (concluding that it is rare that Model Rule
1.14(b) will apply in delinquency proceedings, which mostly involve adolescents
rather than young children); see also Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Standards,
supra note 37, Standards 16.2-.3 (requiring lawyer to request appointment of guardian
ad litem only if client incompetent to understand ramifications or make decisions);
Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Rule 3.1(b) & commentary (same).
154. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
155. Under common law, consent of a parent or guardian usually was necessary to
authorize medical treatment of a minor except in emergency situations. See 1 Kramer,
supra note 16, § 14.13. Most states have passed legislation that enlarges the range of
situations in which minors may consent to medical treatment. For example, under
such statutes, minors may obtain treatment for alcoholism, drug abuse, and pregnancy
and obtain contraceptives and pregnancy detection services, without parental knowl-
edge or consent. IL § 14.14. Statutes permitting minors to obtain abortions without
parental consent have been upheld against constitutional challenges brought by par-
ents. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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waiving constitutional rights in, juvenile court,156 and asserting such
constitutional rights as the right to obtain an abortion.17
In response, parents will argue that there is no need to even con-
sider seeking the appointment of a guardian under Model Rule
1.14(b) because they are already the guardians of their children. 58 In-
deed, the comment provides that "[i]f a legal representative has al-
ready been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look
to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client."' 59 The
problem, of course, is that as "natural guardians," parents do not nec-
essarily have the legal right to act on behalf of their children. 60 For
example, in addition to the already mentioned areas in which children
have been granted the right to engage in decision making on their own
behalf, courts routinely hold that in claims involving a financial inter-
est of a minor-for example, property and tort claims-if the parents
and child have potentially competing financial interests, then the par-
ent is an inappropriate guardian ad litem or next friend.' 6 1
Simply because parents do not necessarily have such a right does
not mean that in the absence of a significant conflict of interests, par-
ents should not be presumed to be the appropriate decision makers in
the legal representation of their children. Indeed one commentator-
Jonathan Hafen-has proposed an amendment to Model Rule 1.14
156. See, e.g., In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 724-25 (Conn. 1988) (stating that
children under 16 may waive right to counsel if they have sufficient intelligence and
capacity to understand the charges and possible punishment, as well as the dangers
and consequences of representing themselves); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1),
449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a juvenile, 14 or older, can waive
privilege against self-incriniination if juvenile was afforded an opportunity to consult
with an interested adult or where the circumstances demonstrate that juvenile fully
understood rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them); see also Fink, supra
note 37, at 122 ("Prerogatives, such as whether to waive the right to counsel, to plead
guilty, to consent to searches of personal property in the child's private areas, or to
waive Miranda rights, are deemed personal to the child and may not be waived by a
parent or other individual."). See generally 2 Kramer, supra note 16, §§ 21.11, 21.14(discussing waiver of right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination,
respectively).
157. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (holding that mature minor
has right to obtain an abortion); see also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring either
parental or judicial consent to abortion for minors under 15 because there was no
opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors wishing
abortions).
158. See, e.g., Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513, 515-16 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (par-
ents in home schooling case successfully resisted defendants' move to have guardian
ad litem appointed for minor children; court agreed that parents were natural guardi-
ans, and that if an actual conflict of interests arose, a guardian ad litem could be
appointed).
159. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.14 cmt. 3.
160. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
161. See Brumley, supra note 121, at 337.
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precisely along these lines.162 There are several problems with the
Hafen proposal. First, it does not establish any criteria to establish
when a "conflict of interests" arises sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of parental decision making.' 63 Second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, the proposal fails to take adequate account of the claim of those
advocates of "children's rights" who argue that children, at least
where they are cognitively able, are entitled to make important deci-
sions for themselves, regardless of the absence of any particular "con-
flict of interests" with their parents.' 64 Of course, Hafen's intent is not
to ignore, but rather to emphatically reject any such claims; 65 as previ-
ously noted, however, these claims are increasingly being recognized
by courts and legislatures in a number of important areas, including
the retention of counsel, accepting and refusing medical treatment,
waiving constitutional rights in juvenile court, and asserting such con-
stitutional rights as the right to an abortion.
66
Ultimately, the Hafen proposal is defective because it improperly
assumes that whether parents have the right to direct lawyers repre-
senting their children is a matter of "ethics law," to be decided primar-
ily by lawyers formulating their own codes of professional conduct. 67
162. See Hafen, supra note 7, at 461-62 (1993) (suggesting an amendment to Model
Rule 1.14 giving parents "a rebuttable right to direct the course of the representation"
except when "the interests of the parent or parents conflict with those of the child, or
the parent or parents have been found 'unfit' by an authorized agency or court"); see
also Neely, supra note 31, at 1399 ("Parents or guardians should be entitled to a pre-
sumption that they speak for their child's interests.").
163. Hafen could not possibly intend for the standard conflicts definition to apply.
Under Model Rule 1.7(b), any actual disagreement between joint clients regarding a
joint course of action would qualify as a conflict of interests, since the lawyer could
not satisfy the desires of each. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. But
surely Hafen does not intend that any disagreement between child and parent over
the course of the representation would serve to disqualify the parent as the effective
decision maker. Some disagreements are clearly too trivial; moreover, the point of
the presumption is precisely to give the parent authority in determining how the rep-
resentation will proceed. Except in the case of children too young to voice an opin-
ion, this authority is useless if it can be overridden at the first sign of disagreement
between parent and child.
164. See, e.g., Brumley, supra note 121, at 343-46 (arguing in favor of greater recog-
nition of children bringing "bad parenting" and other claims over the objection of
their parents); Hafen, supra note 7, at 431-36 (extensively discussing the "children's
rights" movement, including seminal articles by Hillary Rodham Clinton); Hillary
Rodham, Children's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect, 86 Yale L.J. 1522 (1977) (re-
viewing a book about children's policy). See generally Hillary Rodham, Children
Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 487 (1973) (asserting that children are not neces-
sarily incapable of decision making).
165. See Hafen, supra note 7, at 445-47 (rejecting radical view of "children's
rights," in part because of overriding rights of parents and noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court "has made clear that parents enjoy a constitutional right to raise their
children as they see fit so long as their conduct vis-,-vis the child does not fall below a
minimal threshold of 'unfitness' ").
166. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
167. Cf., e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans,
44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 609 (1994) (using "ethics law" to refer to ethics rules
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On the contrary, the tension between "parents' rights" and "children's
rights" can only be resolved as a matter of "other law,"' 68 often by
courts deciding difficult questions under federal and state constitu-
tional law. These questions are hotly contested, with the law of both
parents' and. children's rights still in a relatively early state of
evolution.1
69
In the meantime, as this "other law" continues to evolve, lawyers
must be highly sensitive to the particular context in which the repre-
sentation occurs. For example, in delinquency cases, courts and com-
mentators generally agree that because it is the child whose due
process rights are implicated, it is the child alone who decides, in con-
sultation with the attorney, how the representation will proceed. 170
Similarly, parents are not likely to be granted any decision-making
authority in child custody cases or cases involving claims of parental
misconduct because it is the very fact of a conflict of interests between
parents and child which creates the need for separate representation
on behalf of the child. 7' In the absence of either authoritative law or
a developing consensus among lawyers in the field, lawyers should at
least consult with both parents and child (where feasible) to deter-
promulgated in large part by organized bar). But see Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Profes-
sional Warfare Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an End to the
Current Hostilities, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515, 516 (1992) (stating that "ethics law" should
encompass not only ethical codes, but also "other law" that applies to lawyers).
168. See Moore, supra note 167,'at 516 (describing "other law" as law other than
ethics codes, that affects lawyers and their relationships with clients-for example,
criminal law and procedure, civil procedure, evidence law, agency law, tort law, cota-
tract law, securities law, and corporation law).
169. See also Brumley, supra note 121, at 334 (discussing the "unresolved nature of
the relationship among the rights of minors, parents and state"); Andrew J. Kleinfeld,
The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4 Fam. L.Q. 320(1970) (dealing with the status and rights of children). Compare, e.g., Hafen, supra
note 7, at 442-43 (debunking the "children's rights" movements in favor of "parental
rights") with James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1371, 1426-46 (1994) (arguing that
neither children's interests, parents' interests, nor societal interests justify parents'
rights of control).
170. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Standards, supra note 37, Standard
16.2 ("[T]he ultimate responsibility for making any decision that determines the cli-
ent's interests within the bounds of the law remains with the client."); Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, supra note 69, Standards 3.1(b), 5.2 (stating that juvenile client
generally retains control of the proceeding); Fink, supra note 37, at 119 (stating that
"constitutional due process strictures, ethical mandates, and juvenile justice standards
all underscore the fact that it is the child.., who is the decision maker"); see also
Fisher, supra note 38, at 844 (stating that while Gault did not decide any issue of
parent-child conflict, any rule which gave parents the right to "exercise the range of a
delinquency defendant's due process right" would be of "doubtful constitutionality").
171. See supra notes 33-35, 66-72 and accompanying text. Thus, in this context, the
primary question is whether the lawyer should advocate the child's desires or her own
determination of the child's best interests. See supra note 24.
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mine if a plan of decision making can be adopted that will be satisfac-
tory to all concerned. 172
Even where it has been determined that parents have no legal right
to direct the course of the representation, they may be entitled to be
kept informed and to be regularly consulted, at least where no clear
conflict of interests has emerged. 7 3 Indeed, a parent's presence is
sometimes necessary to facilitate communication between the child
and the lawyer, and in such cases the presence of the parent will not
destroy the confidentiality of attorney-client communications. 174 Nev-
ertheless, there will be times when communication from the parent to
the attorney will not be covered by the attorney-client evidentiary
privilege, presumably when the parent is not also a client and the com-
munication is not strictly necessary to facilitate representation of the
child. Such information is covered by the broader rule of confidential-
ity, which prohibits the lawyer to voluntarily refrain from revealing
any information relating to the representation of a client." However,
172. In many cases, children will be willing to defer to the judgment of their par-
ents. In others, both parents and child might be willing to follow the lawyer's recom-
mendation whenever the parent and child disagree. In some cases, the parents might
be willing to defer to the judgment of a mature minor. Of course, the parties could
also agree to divide the decision making in some manner, perhaps the parent agreeing
to defer in all but a few specified decisions (for example, when to accept a settlement
offer).
173. See Fimk, supra note 37, at 124 ("[J]uvenile delinquency standards also require
lawyers to counsel and consult with parents so that they are able to advise their chi-
dren appropriately."); supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
174. See, eg., Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.3(b) &
commentary ("[W]hile a disclosure in the presence of a third party ordinarily will not
be treated as privileged, the rule may differ if the third party is present in such capac-
ity as to be identified with the client. Thus, a communication may be entitled to legal
protection though, as sometimes happens, the client is accompanied by a parent."
(citations omitted)). Because extremely young children are not typically involved in
the juvenile justice system, the Standards apparently do not contemplate that parent
communications themselves could be covered by the evidentiary privilege. See also id
Standard 3.3(c) (discussing voluntary preservation of secrets of juvenile clients parent
or guardian). However, when the child is extremely young, the child may not be able
to communicate effectively except with the assistance of the parent. Such communi-
cations should be covered under standard evidence law to the extent that the parent is
viewed as a representative of the client for purposes of communication. See, e.g., Pro-
posed Fed. R. Evid. 503(b)(1) (protecting communications between client or client's
"representative" and lawyer or lawyer's "representative"); 1 Charles T. McCormick,
McCormick on Evidence 334-35 & n.12 (4th ed. 1992) (including citation to 1876 case
where court extended protection when mother was "present and acting in the charac-
ter of confidential agent of her daughter"). In addition, in those circumstances in
which the parent has the right to make decisions on behalf of the child (for example,
next friend litigation), see supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text, communications
from the parent to the lawyer and vice versa should also be protected. In these cases,
the parent also should be viewed as a "representative" of the client.
175. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (protecting all "information relating to
the representation of a client" unless client consents or disclosure is authorized by
specified exceptions). For a general discussion of the differences between the attor-
ney-client evidentiary privilege and the professional rule of confidentiality, see Wolf-
ram, supra note 2, §§ 6.1 to 6.7. Regarding the protection of parental communications
18531996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sometimes it may be in the child's best interest for the lawyer to dis-
close or use information gained from a parent, to the disadvantage of
the parent. Parents should be told from the outset of the limits of
confidentiality concerning their own communications with the lawyer
and urged to retain their own counsel when necessary. 176
As with decision making itself,177 the question will occasionally
arise whether children themselves have a right to keep their communi-
cations with the lawyer secret from their parents, or whether, to the
contrary, parents have a right to know. Once again, these are ques-
tions that will ultimately be resolved outside the sphere of legal ethics,
in the current competition between parent's rights and children's
rights. 78 In the meantime, lawyers should raise these questions as
early as possible, discuss them openly, and attempt to attain a consen-
sus among the relevant parties. Of course, any decision not to discuss
with a parent communications from the child to the lawyer does not
necessarily rule out soliciting the parents' views and opinions, which
will often be extremely helpful to the lawyer in the effective represen-
tation of the child.' 79 Rights talk aside, parents usually have the best
interests of their children in mind and should not be ignored as an
important source of information and support.
CONCLUSION
When I was first asked to contribute an Article on conflicts of inter-
ests in the representation of children, I accepted with great pleasure.
First, I was intrigued by the prospect of the Symposium itself-a gath-
ering of expert practitioners and academicians exchanging manu-
not covered under the narrower evidentiary privilege, see Juvenile Justice Standards
Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.3(c) & commentary (where the standard "seeks to
recognize the parents' legitimate expectations and the general importance of inter-
viewing and counseling with regard to family relationships by emphasizing the ethical
obligation of lawyers to hold parents' 'secrets' confidential to the extent they can
consistent with rules of law and the primary responsibility to their clients' interests").
176. See Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.3(c) & com-
mentary. This rule may go too far in urging that a parent's secret communications not
be revealed unless either the "parent competently consents to such revelation or use
after full disclosure" or "such disclosure or use is necessary to the discharge of the
attorney's primary responsibility to the client." Id. Rule 3.3(c)(ii). Although disclo-
sure is clearly mandated when necessary to represent the child competently, lawyers
may not owe parents any particular duty of care; thus, it is unclear why a parent's
consent should be required when a lawyer wants to disclose for reasons short of those
which mandate disclosure. This rule may unconsciously reveal the inevitable tensions
in rules which generally view parents as third-party strangers in the legal representa-
tion of their child.
177. See supra notes 131-72 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
179. See Juvenile Justice Standards Project, supra note 69, Standard 3.3(c) commen-
tary (asserting that the failure to seek information with child's parents and other rela-
tives "may well qualify as abrogation of the lawyer's duty of prompt investigation;"




scripts, ideas, and experiences on the wide range of ethical issues in
representing children. Second, although I had written and lectured
extensively on conflicts of interests in various aspects of legal practice,
I had never seriously considered the unique aspects of dealing with
children as clients and was looking forward to seeing what problems I
would encounter. I have not for one moment regretted accepting the
invitation; however, when I began to see how complex and intractable
some of these issues are (and how little had been written about them),
I did begin to wonder if I was truly up to the task. As my deadlines
came and went (and the Fordham Law Review editors gently nudged
me to submit my manuscript), I found that I could come to terms with
my topic only by acknowledging that what I was contributing could
best be viewed as the opening of a dialogue in which the various issues
are identified and a few tentative solutions put on the table for further
discussion.
Part of the difficulty was that my topic-conflicts of interests-was
in a sense too narrow. As I began to research the topic, I quickly
discovered that lawyers are actively involved in a myriad of situations
involving a clash between the legal interests of children and the inter-
ests of others, such as parents, welfare agencies, or other siblings. Be-
cause the lawyer does not always represent the child, however, not all
these situations present what ethics experts commonly would view as
a true "conflict of interests" problem-that is, one that might be re-
solved under the conflict of interests provisions of current ethical
codes. Thus, my first task was to try to identify and then address those
situations in which my own conflicts expertise might be applicable.
Even here, the task was complicated by the difficulty of determining
precisely when a lawyer forms an attorney-client relationship with a
child, as opposed to the parents-or when a lawyer is (consciously or
unconsciously) representing both parent and child-or what it means
to say that a lawyer is representing a child who can file a lawsuit only
through a next friend, who is typically a parent. Having identified a
wide range of potential problem areas, and suggested some tentative
ways of thinking about just who is a client of the lawyer, I was only
then able to turn to the conflicts provisions of the ethical codes
themselves.
Here, I immediately ran into yet another conceptual difficulty.
When the clients are adults, most conflicts are consentable. But it is
unclear how a lawyer can obtain informed consent when the client is a
child, particularly when the one who would normally give consent on
behalf of the child, the parent, is the other client whom the lawyer is
seeking to represent. Declaring all such conflicts "non-consentable"
might be an easy way out; however, to do so would force a family to
hire two separate lawyers in many situations where clearly one would
do. Moreover, the problem is compounded when the conflict arises
not because the lawyer is attempting to represent both parent and
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child, but when the parent is viewed as a third-party payor. Here, it
can only be concluded that the current ethics codes are clearly inade-
quate. It is often (but not always) the case that parents expect not
only to select and retain a lawyer for their child, but also to be actively
involved in the representation. Nevertheless, the current ethics codes
treat them as if they were third-party strangers with no more legiti-
mate interest in their child's representation than if they were insur-
ance companies or employers. While putting some distance between
lawyer and parent will sometimes be appropriate (for example, in cus-
tody cases and when there are allegations of parental misconduct), in
many situations it is simply absurd.
Many of my questions remain unanswered. This is not only because
so few of the ethics issues have been addressed by either ethics com-
mittees or by courts, but also because there are numerous questions
that do not involve "ethics law" at all (or at least initially), but rather
raise "other," substantive (or even procedural) law questions. The is-
sues range from formation of an attorney-client relationship, to the
legal capacity of children not only to retain their own attorneys but
also to consent to a conflict of interests, to the legal rights of parents
to direct the course of representation of their children, or at least be
informed and consulted in a lawyer's efforts to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of the child.
I am delighted to have been introduced to a whole range of issues
with which I was previously unacquainted. As a parent, I find myself
increasingly anxious to see how the battle between "children's rights"
and "parents' rights" is resolved. As an ethics teacher and scholar, I
look forward to further dealing with all these questions, both inside
and outside the classroom.
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